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I. VoteR FRAUD In tHe UnIteD stAtes: An oVeRVIeW
Since the 2000 election, a historic effort has been underway in the United States to strengthen voting 
systems across all 50 states and to address obstacles to broader electoral participation.  At both the federal 
and state levels, however, efforts to advance a reform agenda have been frequently complicated by heated 
debates over the integrity of voting systems—and by allegations of widespread election fraud, and its co-
hort, voter fraud. 
In Congress, and elsewhere in the national arena, fear of fraud in elections has been revived in many 
policy discussions about our voting system.  In 2002, for example, allegations of widespread voter fraud 
fueled disagreement over voter identification provisions in federal election reform legislation, resulting 
in an acrimonious legislative process that delayed passage of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).  
Oddly enough, fraud and election integrity have been implicated in debates over terrorism and security.  
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks spurred a major legislative initiative, the Real ID Act of 2005, 
which requires states to meet costly minimum security standards for drivers’ licenses that many fear will 
move the country toward a system of national ID—with negative consequences for electoral participation.1 
Voter ID debates currently raging across the states join the disparate issues of voter fraud and election 
integrity, security against terrorist attacks, and identification requirements. Proponents argue that more 
stringent ID requirements like those embodied in a “Real ID” driver’s license are needed to protect against 
voter fraud at the polls, and opponents argue that voter ID is a solution in search of a problem.2
Consequently, the specter of fraud has had a major role in the delay or defeat of some election reforms 
enacted at the state level, and has drawn federal agencies into political controversy.  In 2002, ballot initia-
tives in California and Colorado that would have enacted Election Day Registration (EDR) into law were 
defeated, with opponents of the initiatives arguing that EDR would increase the potential for fraud.3  Since 
then, fraud allegations have fueled stringent and contested voter ID proposals in states like Indiana, Geor-
gia and Missouri.  In Arizona, where allegations of illegal non-citizen voting have flourished, voters passed 
a ballot initiative to make voter registration more difficult by requiring proof of citizenship.  
Moreover, controversy over research on voter ID, voter fraud and voter intimidation conducted for the 
Election Assistance Commission, a federal agency created by HAVA, which suggested little evidence of 
voter fraud and a potentially negative impact of restrictive ID rules on voter turnout, has undermined the 
agency’s credibility, further politicizing the issues.4 Finally, as has been uncovered this year, unfounded 
fraud allegations surrounding the 2004 and 2006 elections are at the center of both a new Justice Depart-
ment program to increase federal fraud prosecutions, and the dismissal of several U.S. Attorneys who 
allegedly failed to prosecute voter fraud, embroiling the Bush Administration in scandal.
Debates over election fraud are not new.  They have been a staple of discussions about elections and 
democracy in the United States for more than a century.  But in recent years, issues of fraud and voting 
integrity have increasingly come to the forefront of public policy discussions over the health of America’s 
democracy.  Even before the 2000 election, consistently low voter turnout rates and obstacles to participa-
tion motivated various efforts to increase voter registration and turnout—efforts that in turn raised ques-
tions about voting integrity.  Critics of some reforms—such as the institution of mail-in voting in Oregon, 
the loosening of guidelines for absentee ballot use, and, most notably, the National Voter Registration Act 
of 1993 (also known as NVRA or the “motor voter” law)—have charged that these reforms increase the po-
tential for voter fraud.  Other frequently proposed reforms, such as Election Day Registration, continue to 
be criticized on the same grounds.
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As federal and state officials consider future reform efforts, as well as the merits of existing reforms, there 
is an acute need for better information and analysis about election and voter fraud issues.  While the issue 
of fraud is raised continually in discussions of election reform, to date there have been few major studies of 
voter fraud in the United States.5  Too often in this area, hearsay and anecdotal information are put forth 
as fact in important public policy debates.6  Many key questions about fraud remain unanswered, includ-
ing: How often does voter fraud occur?  How serious a problem is fraud compared to other problems with 
the election process, such as those that occurred in Florida in the 2000 election or in Ohio in 2004?  What 
kinds of voting methods are most vulnerable to corruption?  What administrative, technological and legal 
steps can be taken to reduce the chances of voter fraud while also expanding opportunities to register and 
vote?
What Is Fraud and Why does It Matter? 
Elections are the mechanisms by which people choose their representatives.  Given that the integrity of 
this process is central to democracy, there can be no compromise on the need for fair elections determined 
without the taint of fraud—whether on the part of voters, political parties, election administrators or others.
Generally speaking, election fraud is a crime involving conduct that corrupts the process of “obtaining and 
marking ballots, the counting and certification of election results, or the registration of voters.”7  Elec-
tion fraud may involve wrongdoing by either individual voters or, as is more often the case, by organized 
groups such as campaigns or political parties.   
Beyond these traditional conceptions of fraud, many people are concerned about official efforts to corrupt 
the election process or erect barriers to participation.  For example, election officials could manipulate 
registration databases to remove the names of people likely to vote in a certain way so that these people 
are unable to cast regular ballots when they arrive at polling places.  Corruption of this kind was widely 
alleged to have taken place in Florida and other states during the 2000 election.9 
Deliberate disfranchisement of voters may also occur because of other kinds of official misconduct: turn-
ing away voters already in line when polls close; intimidating or misinforming voters when they arrive at 
the polls; producing misleading or poorly designed ballots; failing to provide bilingual voting materials, 
as required by law; failing to upgrade or repair voting systems in specific election districts; and by other 
means.
Overall, the disfranchisement of voters through antiquated voting systems, errors, mismanagement of 
registration bases, and intimidation or harassment is a far bigger problem today than traditional forms of 
election fraud.  The problems in Florida in 2000, which determined the outcome of a presidential election, 
are dramatic evidence of this point.10 No number of allegations of voter fraud in 2000, let alone substanti-
ated cases of such fraud in that election, came close to rivaling the number of eligible voters who wanted to 
vote but were unable to do so. This fact is due to a combination of deliberate actions on the part of partisan 
election officials and gross administrative error or incompetence (and that’s in just one state).  
These problems have been analyzed and highlighted in a number of studies and reports over the last 
several years.11 Civil rights advocates have been particularly active in challenging official forms of election 
malfeasance as violating various provisions of the Voting Rights Act.  This report, however, does not focus 
on these issues.  Rather, it looks exclusively at voter fraud as the problem has commonly been discussed 
over the past century.
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Organized Fraud.  Fraud is easier to commit for 
organized groups than it is for individual voters 
because such groups have direct access to election 
machinery and the resources necessary to com-
mit the significant amount of fraud it takes to flip 
election results.  Average voters usually lack these 
things.  In all but the most extraordinary of cas-
es—for instance, when an election victory depends 
on a handful of votes—fraud must be committed 
through a conspiracy to have an impact on the out-
come of an election.  
Such fraud can take several forms. For example:
Political parties, campaign organizations or 
other groups can perpetrate organized fraud 
by obtaining and voting fraudulent absentee or 
mail-in ballots.
Interested groups can organize large-scale 
“commercialization of the vote” or vote buy-
ing—for example, by providing incentives for 
otherwise uninterested voters to go to the polls 
and vote in a certain way or coordinate efforts 
to help enough voters vote more than once.  
Local election administrators or poll work-
ers can commit clear-cut fraud through vote 
rigging, by not counting or destroying ballots, 
allowing votes that should have been barred, 
and tampering with ballots.  
This last example is one of the reasons why partisan 
control of election administration has historically 
created the greatest potential for election fraud.  In 
fact, the most comprehensive studies of election 
fraud conducted when local political machines were 
strong and controlled the machinery of election ad-
ministration in the early decades of the 20th century 
found that, “most election frauds of the period were 
committed by the precinct officers themselves.”8
•
•
•
Individual Fraud.  Unlike most other Western 
democracies, voting in the United States is a two-
stage process.  In nearly all states, an eligible citizen 
who wants to vote must first register using his or 
her permanent home address.  After successfully 
completing a voter registration application, the 
voter goes to the polls or receives voting materials 
through the mail, and then casts his or her ballot.  
Individual vote fraud would happen, conceivably, in 
a couple of ways:
Voters may violate laws governing the registra-
tion process by misrepresenting themselves 
as eligible when they are not, or submitting 
registration applications for fictitious people, 
dead people, or real people who may be either 
eligible or ineligible to vote and who may or 
may not know of or consent to the fraud.
Voters may commit fraud at the point of vot-
ing.  A voter may vote multiple times using the 
name or names of another voter.  In the case of 
a vote cast using the name of a real person, that 
person may or may not be eligible to vote and 
may or may not consent to the fraud.  Voters 
consenting to the appropriation of their vote 
by another may do so because they do not plan 
to vote, have little interest in voting, or receive 
some kind of material benefit.
•
•
Defining Fraud
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Methodology For deMos’ 2003 report, Securing the Vote
The administration of elections for all public offices in the United States, from county dogcatcher to the 
President of the United States, is controlled by state and local election officials.  This causes election pro-
cedures to vary from state to state and in many places, from county to county. Given the complexity, it is 
difficult to assess the overall integrity of U.S. election systems.  No other aspect of American politics has re-
ceived as much scrutiny over the last 50 years as the behavior of the American electorate, and yet, election 
fraud has received very little attention by scholars.  Remarkably, there are no definitive academic studies of 
election fraud in the contemporary period, nor are there focused studies of fraud by government agencies 
concerned with the administration of elections in this country.12
The difficulty of gathering data on fraud explains much of this vacuum in analysis.  Like many of the 
rules governing American elections, the rules dealing with election fraud and the state and local agencies 
assigned the responsibility of handling fraud claims vary from state to state.  In most states the secretary 
of state is the chief elections officer, and his or her office has the primary responsibility for maintaining 
statewide election records.  In some states, complaints of election fraud are first received and investigated 
by the state attorney general.  In a few states, neither the secretary of state nor the attorney general main-
tains voting and elections records or handles any matters related to fraud at all.  Instead, those responsibili-
ties are assigned to a state board of elections or other elections agency.  Since so few fraud claims evidence 
criminal intent, state law enforcement agencies are only occasionally involved in prosecuting cases.  In 
general, the formal responsibility for receiving and investigating complaints of election fraud is allocated 
to local or county boards of elections or district attorneys, with little to no responsibility or accountability 
vested in any state agency.
While the analysis of this report is limited by the lack of comprehensive and accessible statistical data on 
election fraud, the authors of Securing the Vote were able to develop an in-depth analysis of voter fraud in 
the United States today by drawing on a wide range of sources.
First, we conducted an analysis of the incidence of voter fraud from 1992 to 2002 in 12 states that 
collectively represent about half of the  electorate and are drawn from all of the major regions of the 
country.  These states  include: Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia,  Illinois, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas and Wisconsin.  For each of these states, we conducted 
Lexis-Nexis searches of news databases, as well as the statutory and case law for evidence of a record of 
prosecution of voter fraud.  We also contacted selected state officials, including attorneys general and 
secretaries of state.
Second, we conducted a complete Nexis search on voter fraud throughout the United States from 2000 
to 2002, supplemented by searches related to several high-profile cases of election fraud that occurred  
before 2000.  The search produced thousands of articles and references, each of which was thoroughly 
examined.
Third, we surveyed the academic literature, a wide variety of government documents, congressional 
testimony and research reports, law journal articles, and other sources on election reform from profes-
sional, research and reform organizations.
Finally, we analyzed in considerable depth some of the highest-profile cases of real or alleged fraud in 
the United States over the past decade, including notable cases in Missouri, California and Florida.
•
•
•
•
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a FraMeWork For understandIng Fraud 
While heated debates over election fraud have arisen episodically for more than a century, the circum-
stances that surround voting and elections have changed dramatically over that time and continue to 
evolve rapidly today.  Elections can be as contested as ever, but the conditions conducive to election fraud 
have steadily declined, and the trend is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.  Three factors account 
for it: the declining strength of local political parties and machines; strengthened election administration; 
and improved voting technology.  While some voter fraud may occur with any electoral system, current 
trends suggest that it is more possible than ever to further open up the electoral process and facilitate vot-
ing without bringing about greater fraud.  Exaggerated fears of fraud should not stand as an obstacle to 
reforms aimed at expanding participation.
Declining Local Political Machines.  Historically, local political party organizations played an important 
role in perpetrating election fraud.  During the late 19th century and well into the 20th century, a key motive 
for fraud was the immense local patronage benefits afforded to winning parties.  Under these conditions, 
parties, patronage and fraud were intertwined.  Election fraud was perpetrated by partisans acting together 
to steal elections.  Local party organizations competed for voters and controlled votes through patronage.  
When elections were fully controlled by local party organizations, ballots were easily destroyed, miscount-
ed, or falsely multiplied, and voters could be strongly influenced by bosses or local elites to vote in specific 
ways. Typically, cases of election fraud involved organized efforts by partisan election officials, party lead-
ers and politicians rather than by the voters themselves.13 Today, local party organizations are relatively 
weak to nonexistent, in part because their access to patronage has all but disappeared.  They no longer 
control lucrative franchises, run police and fire departments, set utility rates, or build large-scale public 
works.  However, in many states key election officials are openly partisan and may also play an active role 
in partisan political campaigns, a conflict of interest that increases the potential for organized fraud.
Strengthened Election Administration.  At the same time that local political party organizations have 
weakened, modern election administration has become more sophisticated.  The reforms put in place in 
the late 19th century and early 20th century required voters to register in advance of elections and election 
authorities to keep registration records.  While some reforms such as voter registration and the secret bal-
lot reduced opportunities for organized fraud, they also had a negative impact on electoral participation, 
making voting especially more difficult for poor and working-class people.14 The passage of the National 
Voter Registration Act of 1993 as well as the advent of Election Day Registration in a number of states have 
helped to reduce the obstacles to voting that accompanied the imposition of voter registration require-
ments over a century ago.  In the wake of the 2000 election, considerable attention has been focused on 
ways to improve election administration to strengthen the integrity of the election process; a number of 
reform measures have already been passed in the states.  Particular attention has been given to the need 
to create accurate statewide computerized registration systems in all states, as now required by the Help 
America Vote Act of 2002.  To the extent that further reforms upgrade accuracy, record-keeping and ac-
countability, professionalize service delivery, and simplify the process for voters, election administration 
can continue to be strengthened as a bulwark against fraud.
Improved Voting Technology.  Mechanization and the application of vote counting technology in the 
1960s loosened the control local party workers could exercise over vote counting and significantly reduced 
opportunities for organized election fraud.  In fact, in his research on election administration in the 1920s, 
the early election reformer Joseph Harris came to believe that most electoral corruption was committed 
by precinct workers during the vote count.  Then, like now in many places around the country, the polls 
were staffed on Election Day by people chosen by the major political parties which dominated many local 
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boards of elections.  Then, unlike now, when the voting was finished, poll workers opened up the ballot 
boxes and counted the paper ballots at the polling site in back rooms out of the glare of public scrutiny 
or official supervision.  Harris believed that one of the best ways to clean up American elections was to 
take the vote counting responsibility away from the control of party machines and their poll workers.  In 
the early 1960s, his thinking about the sources of election fraud led him to develop the concept for what 
became the punch card ballot.  Harris reasoned that if poll workers were corrupting the vote count there 
were at least two ways to address the problem: either get rid of partisan poll workers, or take away their 
responsibility for counting the votes.  He eventually sold his concept for machine-readable ballots to IBM 
which designed the punch card technology to do just that.  Vote counting was physically moved out of the 
polling site, out of the hands of thousands of unskilled poll workers, and into the high tech world of com-
puters programmed and operated by a smaller cadre of better trained, better educated, supposedly politi-
cally neutral bureaucrats.15 Today, we don’t worry so much about poll workers corrupting the vote count 
because poll workers don’t count the votes.    
On the other hand, technology itself provides no simple guarantee or solution to fraud, as the current 
controversy over the reliability and security of electronic voting equipment makes clear.  An ideal voting 
system should accurately record and tally the votes of all eligible voters who desire to vote and who cast 
legal votes, and should provide evidence that the election results reflect their will.  Technology can help 
us achieve these goals if it is part of a larger effort to secure voting rights and a fair count.  Since the 2000 
election, states have moved to implement major technology upgrades that help prevent voter fraud, com-
puterizing and centralizing their voter files, for example, though much more work in this area remains to 
be done.  
electIon Fraud today
Based on the research and analysis conducted for Securing the Vote, we offer several conclusions about 
election fraud in the United States today:
Voter fraud appears to be very rare in the 12 states examined in that report.  Legal and news records 
turned up little evidence of significant fraud in these states or any indication that fraud is more than a 
minor problem.  Interviews with state officials further confirmed this impression.  
Notable election reforms of the past 10 to 15 years—such as the NVRA, more permissive absentee 
balloting rules, all mail-in voting in Oregon, and the enactment of Election Day Registration in several 
more states—have not facilitated voter fraud. 
Analysis of several cases of election fraud that have received  significant attention in recent years sug-
gests that some of the most notable allegations of fraud have proved to be baseless.  While the 1997 
mayoral primary election in Miami, Florida, was one of the most egregious election fraud cases in re-
cent memory, there are other noted cases where charges of significant vote fraud have been disproved, 
such as the 1996 Dornan/Sanchez contest for the U.S. House of Representatives in Orange County, 
California.  There are yet other cases, such as the 2000 election in St. Louis, Missouri, in which politi-
cians have made great hay, but charges of widespread fraud have not been substantiated.  A new Dem-
os report on voter fraud in states offering Election Day Registration finds that despite the hundreds 
of news stories reporting on allegations of voter fraud in Wisconsin in the 2004 presidential election, 
practically no fraud has ever been proven.  An intensive effort on the part of the federal government to 
uncover and prosecute voter fraud in Wisconsin resulted in only 14 indictments and five convictions 
or guilty pleas for illegal voting in an election in which over 3 million ballots were cast.16
•
•
•
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The low level of voter fraud in the United States today does not preclude the need for continued vigilance 
to ensure the integrity of election systems. It does, however, suggest that reforms aimed at simplifying 
registration and voting can be implemented without risking corruption of elections by fraud.  Even if only 
partly implemented, some of the many technological and administrative reforms recommended by nation-
al and state commissions since the 2000 election, as well as other “best practices,” can go a long way toward 
enhancing election integrity.17 These are reforms such as continued upgrading of the accuracy of voter 
registration lists, once-in-a-lifetime registration, better notice and opportunity to voters to correct their 
records, improved use of communications technology to better inform voters and resolve administrative 
problems on Election Day, automatic notification to election officials upon the restoration of voting rights 
of convicted felons, improved efficiency in the transmittal to elections officials of voter registration forms 
collected at NVRA-designated state agencies, and increased recruitment, pay and training of poll workers. 
These same reforms can facilitate programs, such as Election Day Registration, that are intended to make 
voting easier and more convenient for eligible voters.
II. VoteR FRAUD AnD tHe LAW  
The opportunity to commit voter fraud is constrained by a matrix of state and federal laws.  Voter fraud is 
a serious crime that can be prosecuted at the federal and state levels, where penalties carry fines, lengthy 
prison terms, and, in the case of illegal voting by non-citizens, deportation.18 However, the effectiveness of 
laws depends on their enforcement and implementation.
state laWs and enForceMent
The U.S. Constitution grants states broad jurisdiction over the election process, though the authority of the 
states in these matters is not absolute.19 The Fifteenth, Nineteenth and Twenty-sixth Amendments prohibit 
states from restricting the franchise based on race or color, gender or minimum age (18 years) of the voter, 
respectively.  The Supreme Court has found that Congress is within its constitutional authority to pass 
laws governing the timing of federal elections, voter registration, access to the ballot for the elderly and 
disabled, and, perhaps most important, in the area of prohibitions against racially discriminatory voting 
practices.20 However, states are granted wide powers to qualify voters and establish rules for conducting 
federal, state and local elections.
Within this complex framework for regulating the electoral process, states have exhibited a full flowering 
of differences in the manner in which they administer elections.  State election laws governing voting vary 
in their level of specificity, with many states granting localities considerable discretion in the way they run 
elections.  For example, Oklahoma has standard Election Day procedures and a single voter registration 
and election management system, and it uses only one type of voting machine.  In contrast, before the 
enactment of HAVA, Pennsylvania’s election law provided few statewide guidelines and near-autonomy 
to the state’s 67 counties in the matter of Election Day procedures.  Pennsylvania had 67 different election 
systems using a variety of voting machines.21
Federalism, and the authority over election procedures granted to states, also explains why laws criminal-
izing fraud differ across the states.  All states have laws governing election crime.  However, because of 
the historically parochial manner in which states administer elections, they vary in how they handle the 
problem of criminal election fraud.  All states prohibit voting by non-citizens (although some localities 
permit such voting in local elections); most states have various restrictions that bar voting by individuals 
convicted of felonies,22 as well those who have been ruled mentally incompetent by a court.  Most states 
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have prohibitions against falsifying voter registration information, voting more than once in an election, 
impersonating another voter, intimidating or coercing voters, and bribing voters or buying votes.  Most of 
these crimes are classified as felonies and carry fines and prison sentences.  In some states, a person con-
victed of certain voter fraud crimes can permanently lose his or her right to vote.
State election laws allocate the responsibility for ensuring fair elections to various agencies and officials, 
and it is their responsibility to administer and monitor the electoral process to ensure that it is free of cor-
ruption.  Local election and law enforcement officials also play a role in enforcing election laws, although 
the familiarity of these officials with the ins and outs of election laws and the lines of enforcement author-
ity varies considerably within states.  While it is incumbent upon government officials to bring criminal 
charges where appropriate, all states also empower private citizens and organizations to bring civil suits to 
contest election results.23  Likewise, the NVRA provides a private right of action to any person aggrieved 
by a violation of the Act.24
Federal laWs and enForceMent
Despite state jurisdiction over election administration, there is a role for the federal government in pros-
ecuting voter fraud when federal interests are at stake.
Historically, the federal role has extended to ensuring elections that are free of corruption and in eliminat-
ing discrimination against minority voters protected by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended.  The 
enforcement of the Voting Rights Act concerns civil offenses and is handled by the Justice Department’s 
Civil Rights Division.  Election-related crimes are handled by the Public Integrity Section of the Justice 
Department’s Criminal Division.  
Federal election law is an amalgamation of statutes.  Some of them expressly apply to elections and vot-
ing, and others, such as statutes prohibiting mail fraud, have been used to prevent and punish voter fraud.  
Most federal statutes apply only to federal or mixed federal/state and local elections.  In order for election 
crime to rise to the level of federal prosecution, there must be some “substantive irregularity relating to the 
voting act ... which has the potential to taint the election itself.”25 The Supreme Court has found a constitu-
tionally guaranteed right to vote and Congress has passed legislation to protect this most fundamental of 
all rights.  There remains debate, however, over whether or not the Constitution guarantees a right to vote 
in purely state and local contests—here the judicial record is inconsistent.  Federal prosecutors, therefore, 
avoid investigating fraud allegedly committed in these elections.
Federal election law can be divided into two categories: anti-intimidation laws and anti-trafficking laws.  
Anti-intimidation laws make it a felony to conspire to “injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any inhab-
itant of any State, Territory, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured 
to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States or because of his having exercised the same.”26 
They also provide for criminal punishment of anyone who deprives another of federally secured rights to 
vote.  Anti-trafficking laws, on the other hand, restrict a citizen’s right to vote by prohibiting the offering, 
making, soliciting or receiving of payments in return for voting or withholding a vote.  Penalties include 
a fine of up to $10,000 and five years imprisonment.  Until a policy change instituted in 2002 by the Bush 
Administration’s first Attorney General, John Ashcroft, the Justice Department, as a matter of practice, 
did not prosecute voters whose only involvement in voter fraud was in compromising their votes. Nor did 
it advocate the prosecution of isolated instances of illegal registration, vote buying, or fraudulent voting 
because “isolated incidents do not implicate federal interests sufficiently” to warrant federal interference in 
what is traditionally a state function.27 It appears that the majority of vote buying schemes that are pros-
ecuted involve small amounts of money and occur in low-income neighborhoods.28
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On October 1, 2002, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the Ballot Access and Voting Integ-
rity Initiative, aimed at enhancing the Department of Justice’s “ability to deter discrimination and election 
fraud, and ... to prosecute violators vigorously whenever and wherever these offenses occur.”29 The initia-
tive involved the creation of task forces of district election officers who are assistant U.S. attorneys ap-
pointed by each of the U.S. attorneys to serve in this new capacity for two-year intervals; and FBI officials, 
whose job it is to participate in “on-the-ground investigative and prosecutorial coordination” with state 
and local elections and law enforcement personnel to “deter and detect discrimination, prevent electoral 
corruption, and bring violators to justice.”30
Federal monitoring of elections has been around since the Reconstruction period, but most often it has 
been directed toward protecting the voting rights of minority groups at the polls.  What is significant about 
the Justice Department’s involvement in recent elections is the linking of voting rights with protection 
from corruption of the electoral process by voter fraud, reflecting a new view that voter fraud deserves the 
same level of scrutiny from federal law enforcement officials as was historically required to guard against 
racial discrimination in voting.  And yet, the Justice Department’s new project has still to yield any evi-
dence that contradicts the basic findings of this report on the low incidence of voter fraud in contempo-
rary U.S. elections.  Despite the elevated law enforcement priority, the federal government indicted only 
40 voters for election crimes related to illegal voting between 2002 and 2005, obtaining 26 convictions or 
guilty pleas, for a nationwide average of eight to nine illegal voters a year.  These were all isolated instances, 
in some cases, of confusion or voter error, having no impact on electoral outcomes.  In Milwaukee where 
a third of the indictments were handed down, an assistant U.S. attorney who prosecuted a number of the 
cases was forced to conclude that, “There was nothing that we uncovered that suggested some sort of con-
certed effort to tilt the [2004] election.”31
III. MAJoR ReCent CAses oF ALLeGeD eLeCtIon FRAUD
The cases described below illustrate the following conclusions drawn from the analysis presented in this 
report: 1) the potential for abuse of absentee ballot laws remains a concern; 2) for fraud to threaten elector-
al integrity, it must be organized; 3) organized fraud that does affect electoral outcomes is not inordinately 
difficult to detect and punish because it largely occurs in public, involves many players, and leaves a paper 
trail;32 4) mistakes by voters and election officials happen, perhaps more regularly than we know, but they 
are not fraud; nevertheless, under certain conditions partisans will exploit mistakes, errors and incompe-
tence in the administration of elections to create the appearance of fraud and gain competitive electoral 
advantage.
the 1997 prIMary Mayoral electIon, MIaMI, FlorIda
Perhaps the best-known contemporary case of uncontroverted absentee ballot fraud is the disputed 1997 
primary mayoral election in Miami, Florida.33 Running for reelection as mayor, Joe Carollo received 51.4 
percent of the ballots cast at the polls, while his opponent, former Mayor Xavier Suarez, received 61.5 per-
cent of the absentee ballots, giving Suarez a slim lead of 155 votes over Carollo in total balloting. Because 
neither candidate received more than 50 percent of the vote, a run-off election was held, and Suarez nar-
rowly won both the precinct and absentee ballots.34
Carollo immediately challenged the initial November 4th election results, claiming fraud in the absentee 
ballot vote that had swung that election to Suarez, denying Carollo the majority support he received at the 
polls and forcing him into a run-off.  A week after the first election, the Florida Department of Law En-
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forcement had arrested two Suarez supporters for buying absentee ballots and falsely witnessing absentee 
ballots.  Once Carollo lost the run-off to Suarez, he petitioned the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial 
Circuit of Florida to overturn the results of the November 4th primary on grounds of fraud.
The trial was held in February 1998.  For two and a half weeks, the court heard evidence and read de-
positions from 87 witnesses and  examined 195 exhibits.35  Its March 3rd decision noted “a pattern of 
fraudulent, intentional and criminal conduct” in the extensive abuse of absentee ballot laws.36  An expert 
documents examiner testified that 225 absentee ballots cast had forged signatures; there was evidence of 
14 stolen ballots and 140 improperly witnessed ballots.  Another 480 ballots were procured or witnessed 
by 29 “ballot brokers,” 27 of whom invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
instead of testifying at trial.  One such ballot broker was 92-year-old Alberto Russi, a campaign volunteer 
for Humberto Hernandez, a Suarez ally on the five-member City Commission.  Within days of the primary 
election, Russi was arrested and charged with three counts of election fraud.  Police traced Russi to the 
absentee ballot of a dead man whose ballot he witnessed.  When police searched Russi’s home they seized 
75 absentee ballots already filled out and intended for the November 13 run-off, many of which were ad-
dressed to Russi’s home in the names of other voters.  A separate grand jury, convened to investigate the 
fraud allegations and make recommendations for improvements in the absentee ballot process, found 
that absentee ballots were stolen from mailboxes, that “unscrupulous individuals” had secured ballots for 
people under the guise of “helping the voter,” and that voters had been coerced into voting for particular 
candidates in return for past favors done for them.37
At the center of what the trial court subsequently found to be “a massive, well-conceived  and  well-orches-
trated absentee ballot voter fraud scheme” were a large number of absentee ballots—nearly 70 percent of 
the total—cast from Little Havana.  Little Havana voters reinstalled Commissioner Hernandez, the em-
battled Suarez ally who won reelection to  the City Commission by a large majority after being removed 
from office by the governor following a 23-count indictment for bank fraud and  money  laundering.38 An 
expert in statistical analysis testified at trial that the large number of absentee ballots from Little Havana 
was a statistical “outlier,” the Little Havana absentee ballot rate was an “aberrant case” so unlikely that it 
was “literally off the [statistical probability] charts.”
The trial judge, Thomas S. Wilson Jr., concluded that “the evidence shows a pattern of fraudulent, inten-
tional and criminal conduct that resulted in such an extensive abuse of the absentee ballot laws that it can 
fairly be said that the intent of these laws was totally frustrated.... This scheme to defraud, literally and 
figuratively stole the ballot from the hands of every honest voter in the city of Miami.”39 Judge Wilson over-
turned the results of the November 4 election and ordered a new election, but his remedy was overturned 
on appeal.  The appellate court affirmed the finding of fraud but voided the remedy of a new election and 
remanded the case to the lower court with instructions to enter a final judgment that voided all of the 
absentee ballots, determining the outcome of the election by the machine total alone. This decision took 
victory out of Xavier Suarez’s hands and gave it to Miami’s new mayor, Joe Carollo.
The 1997 Miami mayor’s race presents one of the more egregious cases of election fraud in recent memory. 
As an outlier, it is nevertheless instructive.  To affect the outcome of an election, fraud needs to be “mas-
sive,” as the trial judge found.  This requires organization and coordination among multiple actors willing 
to break the law and risk significant punishment; in other words, a conspiracy.  The need for organization 
to orchestrate enough fraud to flip the results of an election is the hook to detection.  Here, Florida’s civil 
election contest procedures worked as they should have, providing the candidate—and by extension, the 
voters—harmed by the fraud a means of challenging the distorted results.  The fraud was immediately 
discovered through conventional criminal investigation.  
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News coverage of the fraud scheme and trial was extensive and national and local leaders and residents 
loudly bemoaned the further tarnishing of the city’s image as one steeped in political corruption.  The state 
legislature acted quickly to pass a $4 million election law reform package to root out voter fraud.  Unfor-
tunately, the law did much more than that and had a perverse effect on election administration.  In its zeal 
to address the embarrassing behavior of politicians in Miami, the Republican-controlled legislature passed 
a law that paved the way for one of the scandals of the 2000 election in Florida: the massive disfranchise-
ment of Florida voters—most of them African American—whose names erroneously appeared on felony 
lists.40
In May 1998, the legislature added Section 98.0975 to Title IX, Chapter 98 of Florida’s statutes.  Section 
98.0975 required the Division of Elections in the secretary of state’s office to contract with a private com-
pany to compare the central voter file with databases of persons deceased, those with felony convictions, 
and those adjudicated mentally incompetent and to provide lists of matching names to the division.  The 
rules for matching names were developed by state officials, against the advice of the company hired to 
produce the lists, requiring a “match” based on only the first four letters of the first name, 90 percent of the 
last name and an approximate date of birth.41 The elections division was required to provide the informa-
tion to the county supervisors of elections who were to undertake their own verification process on local 
voter registration databases.  The lists were highly inaccurate, for example, one list contained the names 
of 8,000 Florida residents who had committed misdemeanors, not felonies, in Texas.42 There is little doubt 
that thousands of legal Florida voters were erroneously purged from the rolls and prevented from voting in 
Florida in 2000.  Florida was the only state in the United States to require its local election officials to verify 
their voter rolls using data processed by a private firm.43 Those arrangements were easily manipulated by 
partisan election officials to shape electoral outcomes.
the 1996 dornan/sanchez contest For the u.s. house oF representatIves, 
orange county, calIFornIa
Orange County, California, is the fourth largest county in the United States, with 2.8 million people count-
ed in the 2000 census, more than one-quarter of them Latino.  The 46th Congressional District is nestled in 
the heart of Orange County and includes centers of Latino concentration, Santa Ana, the county seat, and 
most of Garden Grove and Anaheim, giving the 46th district a population that is nearly two-thirds Latino.  
Vast growth and demographic change, along with careful redistricting by Democrats in California’s state 
legislature, have facilitated political change in Orange County.  Orange County was once a Republican 
stronghold, a core constituency for the Republican party in presidential elections because it could swing 
California to the party.44 As late as 1988, voters in the 46th district gave 62 percent of their votes to George 
H.W. Bush.  By 2000, however, a 24 percent Republican margin in presidential elections had been replaced 
by a 12 percent Democratic margin when Al Gore won the 46th with 54 percent of the vote to 42 percent 
for George W. Bush.  The increasing ability of new immigrant and Latino voters to define Orange County 
politics and the transformation in party dominance toward the Democrats set the stage for an explosive 
case of alleged voter fraud in 1996.
The contested election between the nine-term Republican incumbent Robert K. Dornan and a little-known 
businesswoman named Loretta Sanchez involved a blizzard of allegations of registration fraud, non-citizen 
and illegal immigrant voting, double voting, voting from nonresidential addresses, illegal inducements to 
register and vote, voter intimidation, ballot box tampering, and absentee ballot fraud, all under the canopy 
of a bitter and protracted partisan battle that quickly bled into national politics.
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One day after the November 5, 1996, election, Dornan led Sanchez by 233 votes, but 12,000 absentee and 
provisional ballots had yet to be counted.  A week later, when about 3,000 ballots were still left to tally, the 
Associated Press called the election for Sanchez, who had moved into the lead with a 929-vote margin.  As 
the count proceeded, Dornan repeatedly raised the issue of “non-citizen” voter fraud and vowed to take his 
re-election fight to the floor of the House of Representatives if he lost.  He added that his Republican col-
leagues were looking for a case to use in challenging the recently implemented National Voter Registration 
Act, signaling the likely entry of national political forces into the fray.45 Dornan specifically charged that 
a well-known Latino rights group and the Democratic Party signed up illegal voters in a drive he argued 
may have led to “the first case in history where a congressional election was decided by non-citizens.”46 His 
lawyer later called the case “what we think is the single largest example of voter fraud in a federal election 
in the last 50 years, and, yes, maybe in this century.”47
On November 22, 1996, the Orange County Registrar of Voters certified Loretta Sanchez the winner by 
984 votes,48 and a 14-month battle to deny Sanchez a seat in the House was joined.  State electoral and law 
enforcement agencies were the first to open investigations into the alleged election irregularities.  Then, on 
December 26, 1996, Dornan filed a three-page Notice of Electoral Contest in the House of Representatives 
requesting an investigation of the election.  This was within keeping of his prerogative and the consti-
tutional authority of the House under Article 1, Section 5, Clause 1, which provides that each House of 
Congress shall be the judge of the “elections, returns and qualifications” of its members.  Under the rules 
of the federal Electoral Count Act, the contest is first heard by the Committee on House Oversight, which 
conducts its own investigation, and then by the whole House, which disposes of the contest by resolution 
or majority vote.  In the 105th Congress, the eight-member committee was chaired by Rep. William M.  
Thomas, a Republican from Bakersfield, California, and dominated five-to-three by Republican members.  
Thomas created a three-person task force comprised of Rep. Vernon Ehlers (R-Mich.) and Rep. Robert Ney 
(R-Ohio), and, later, Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) to conduct the investigation and recommend a course of 
action to the full committee.  Along with the Orange County D.A. and secretary of state investigations, the 
House committee’s investigation took a year to complete and produced, in the end, a disputed finding of 
fraud that was too insubstantial to convince the Republican dominated House to upset or reverse Sanchez’s 
victory.49 On February 12, 1998, the House voted 378-33 to dismiss Dornan’s contest.
The Dornan-Sanchez electoral dispute fits squarely with what political  scientists Benjamin Ginsberg and 
Martin Shefter call “politics by other  means.”  Politics by other means involves the use of legal strategies 
and the courts, revelation, prosecution and investigation, and the media to win.50 The fraud allegations and 
subsequent 14-month investigations by state, county and federal government agencies cost American tax-
payers well over $1.4 million.51 In the end, very little voter fraud was convincingly substantiated.  On April 
29, 1998, California’s Republican secretary of state announced that the people identified by the task force 
as illegal, non-citizen voters in the 46th Congressional District election of 1996 would not be prosecuted for 
voter fraud, the secretary deciding that they had registered in error and not from criminal intent.52
the 2000 electIon, st. louIs, MIssourI 
Like most big cities, St. Louis has had its share of election fraud investigations in the past.53 In the wake 
of the 2000 election, allegations of voter fraud in St. Louis were raised that included illegal registration; 
voting by deceased people, felons, and people whose addresses appeared to be vacant lots; multiple voting; 
and unqualified election judges permitting unqualified voters to cast illegal ballots.  Before the facts were 
known, wild accusations of a vast conspiracy on the part of the Democrats to undertake “a major criminal 
enterprise designed to defraud voters” captured national media attention.54
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The St. Louis case gained national notoriety because the partisan conflict between a senior Missouri Re-
publican senator and a newly elected St. Louis Democratic representative underlying it erupted in congres-
sional hearings and other public venues, giving the story a wider national audience than it would have had 
otherwise.  It also received attention in the wake of the Florida 2000 debacle and then again going forward 
as Congress struggled with election reform over the next year and a half.  As will be explained, the contem-
porary St. Louis case is a good example of how the forces promoting expanded access to the franchise are 
forced to compromise under the cloud of fraud—sometimes real, but more often conjured up—to achieve 
electoral “reform.”
In the months leading up to the election, African-American leaders in St. Louis became concerned that 
the recent removal of more than 30,000 names from the registration rolls to an “inactive” list would create 
problems at the polls on Election Day.  State Senator William Lacy Clay Jr., a candidate for a seat in the 
U.S. House of Representatives, gave a speech the day before the election in which he warned that if eligible 
voters were prohibited from voting at the polls because of inaccurate registration records, lawsuits would 
be brought to keep the polls open past their legal closing time of 7 p.m.55 In fact, that is exactly what hap-
pened.  Hundreds of eligible voters were unable to vote because their names had been put on “inactive” 
lists which were not distributed to St. Louis’s more than 250 polling places.  Poll workers were told to call 
headquarters to verify the eligibility of voters whose names were not on their lists, but the problem was 
so extensive, the phone lines were jammed for most of the day.  When poll workers were unable to get 
through, they told voters to go down to the Board’s main office to plead their case.  Hundreds of people 
tried to cram into the Board’s office at 300 North Tucker Boulevard.  Many were still standing in line at  
10 p.m., demanding their right to vote.  
In the late afternoon of Election Day, Lacy Clay’s campaign, the Gore-Lieberman campaign, and the Mis-
souri State Democratic Committee filed suit in St. Louis City Circuit Court to keep the polls open late so 
that registered voters whose records had been mishandled by the Board could vote.  A sympathetic judge 
issued an order to extend voting hours, but the Missouri Court of Appeals quickly overruled her.  The polls 
in St. Louis shut down at 7:45 p.m., with only about a hundred additional votes cast after the official 7 p.m. 
poll closing time.56
As expected, the Democrats did very well in St. Louis, a heavily Democratic city, but they also did well 
statewide where Republicans had long held power, electing a Democrat to the U.S. Senate and as governor.  
These were troubling signs to Missouri Republican leaders.  Within two days of the election, the state’s 
senior U.S. Senator, Republican Christopher “Kit” Bond, called for a federal investigation of voting in St. 
Louis, hinting at a conspiracy behind the Democrats’ efforts to extend polling place hours.  “What I saw 
and heard on Tuesday night is an outrage,” he screamed on national television as he pounded a lectern at a 
local Republican party event, adding that the St. Louis Election Board and the Democratic Party should be 
investigated for “orchestrat[ing] a concerted scheme to deny all Missouri voters a valid count by keeping 
the polls open.”57
Post-election investigations conducted within weeks of the election by the newly elected Republican 
secretary of state, Matt Blunt, and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch suggested only a marginal amount of voter 
fraud may have been committed in 2000.  Voter and election worker error which later would prove to be 
the source of the irregularities did not receive the same amount of attention, at least at first.  The extent 
of St. Louis’ election administration meltdown unfolded slowly, even as the partisan rhetoric heated up.  
Most of the initial charges about criminal conspiracies and the defrauding of Missouri voters were even-
tually shown to be overblown.  For example, hundreds if not thousands of “ghost voters” were allegedly 
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registered at vacant lot properties.   Bond and others jumped on the allegations to further fuel their fraud 
charges.  The secretary of state’s probe significantly reduced the number of vacant lot addresses to 79 vot-
ers, and subsequent investigations a year later by reporters at the St. Louis Post-Dispatch discovered that 
“dozens of St. Louis voters are being wrongly accused of casting ballots from fraudulent addresses” in the 
2000 election.  The Post-Dispatch surveyed 1,000 supposedly vacant lots and found that 704 of them had 
buildings on them, some of them more than 50 years old.58  Errors in the city’s property records and meth-
ods for classifying vacant a multi-parcel address if only one of the parcels at the address is vacant account 
for the mistakes in the voter records.  
With no indictments for fraudulent voter registration and the problem of vacant lot addresses largely 
solved, Bond and Blunt focused on court orders permitting 1,233 people to vote.  Bond again suggested a 
criminal conspiracy to create chaos on Election Day so that the Democrats could stuff ballot boxes with 
fraudulent votes procured through illegally obtained court orders.  The court orders were issued by St. 
Louis City and St. Louis County election judges for reasons Blunt argued did not conform to Missouri law.  
Some of the court orders appeared to be granted to people who acknowledged that they had failed to reg-
ister by the October 11 deadline, although judges interviewed by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch said that they 
believed their court orders complied with state law.59  St. Louis County judge Robert S. Cohen said that 
election officials first screened voters who believed they were eligible to vote but who were not on voter 
registration lists; voters then had to wait in long lines to have their cases reviewed by an election judge.  
Cohen explained to a reporter:
“This process had taken them hours and hours.  Some had babies with them; some had wheel-
chairs; some had taken off work.  We were trying to accommodate people in a long line and get 
them in and out.  We were erring on the side of allowing people to vote.  Rejecting an American 
citizen at the poll who appears to have engaged in no fraud ... it’s a difficult thing to turn that 
person away and say you cannot vote, you cannot participate in the democracy today.”60
It would take an FBI investigation in which all of the registration and voting records from the St. Louis 
City Elections Board for the month preceding the election were subpoenaed before the facts could 
emerge.61  Once that investigation was completed, to the surprise of many, Bond included, the Justice 
Department threatened the Board with a lawsuit for abusing the voting rights of thousands of eligible St. 
Louis voters by illegally purging their registration records in violation of the NVRA.  It was these illegal 
purges that created much of the chaos on Election Day leading to more record-keeping errors and mis-
takes, and the appearance of election irregularities.  The resulting consent decree stipulated how the Board 
would change its policies and procedures for maintaining accurate registration records and how it would 
comply with federal requirements for notifying voters of their registration status and handling voter lists 
on Election Day.  Thus, the alleged voter fraud conspiracy in St. Louis was nothing more than a case of 
managerial ineptitude, administrative under-funding, and poor implementation of the NVRA on the part 
of St. Louis and Missouri election officials—made worse by partisan rancor and racial politics in a high 
interest, competitive election.
The politics of voter fraud in St. Louis spilled over into the national debate on election reform that gripped 
the country after the Florida election debacle of 2000.  Bond came to play a key role in the legislative 
battles over the Help America Vote Act of 2002.  At his insistence, the act included a plank that requires 
voters to cast only provisional ballots if voting occurs after polls have been ordered to stay open beyond 
their legal closing time by state or federal courts.62 Bond was also a leading proponent of federal identifica-
tion requirements for registration and voting.  During the debates over the Senate’s initial version of the 
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bill, intense squabbling over voter ID provisions which were demanded by Bond and other Republicans 
nearly derailed legislative passage.  The House bill included no such provisions and civil rights and elec-
toral reform advocates vowed to work hard against any compromise that included new ID requirements.  
But during the House and Senate conference on the bill, Bond and Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the 
Senate’s Republican bill managers, let it be known that Republicans would not back down and that the 
voter ID issue was a deal-breaker.63 The final bill included ID requirements but limited them to first-time 
voters registering by mail.  The retreat by congressional Democrats on the ID issue split the liberal advo-
cacy community which had waged a long and hard-fought effort to win minimum standards and funding 
to fix the nation’s electoral machinery.  They split, with some condemning the final bill and others offering 
tepid support.64  In hindsight, the HAVA ID requirement, limited as it may be, nevertheless paved the way 
for a partisan movement in the states that uses allegations of voter fraud to impose more and more restric-
tive identification requirements on voting.  The lesson is that the politics of voter fraud matter more for the 
election rules we get than the actual evidence of voter fraud itself.    
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